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Abstract: 
Knowing whether or not a company is financial stable has always been a top concern for 
analysts and money managers. This paper compares the effectiveness of default prediction using 
two different types of measures: accounting and market based. Accounting measures have been 
the most popular even though, according to theory, a market based measure reflects all available 
information. Theory goes as far to say that accounting measures can add no incremental value to 
a market based measure. In my research I found that accounting based measures can be effective 
in their predictive power; the market-based measure (BSM) results were much more difficult to 
estimate within the limits of this research project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2	  
	  
 
I. Introduction 
My paper is closely related to Hillegeist, Cram, Keating, and Lundstedt (2002). In their 
paper, they compare two common aggregates of information: accounting-based and market-
based measures. The popular accounting-based measures of Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980), 
known as Z-Score and O-Score, are derived from public information and should be accurate 
indicators of how well a company is doing. The market-based measure is one taken from the 
work of both Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), henceforth BSM. Any market-based 
measure should reflect all information available at a given time and beliefs regarding the future. 
With an understanding of both of these measures, the BSM measure could be more informative 
then the Z-score or O-score, especially if the past is expected to be drastically different than the 
future.  
My approach is to replicate the process of Hillegeist et al. (2002) in calculating the fore 
mentioned information aggregates extending their analysis seventeen years through 2014. The 
bankruptcy sample I use is smaller, 183 bankruptcies compared to their 516 bankruptcies. 
Hillegeist et al. (2002) uses a discrete hazard model to incorporate multi-period changes. I use a 
single period logit model for my analysis due to the complexity of the discrete hazard model. I 
was able to come to similar conclusions surrounding the effectiveness of accounting-based 
measures and their predictive power; the market-based measure (BSM) results were much more 
difficult to estimate within the limits of this research project.  
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II. Research Design 
 
a. Accounting-based 
The Z-Score and O-Score equations come from the work of Altman (1968) and Ohlson 
(1980) respectively. Altman (1968) has become the most influential in corporate bankruptcy 
prediction. He developed the Z-Score through choosing the five variables that had the most 
predictive power in a multivariate discriminant analysis model, MDA. In order to estimate the Z-
Score coefficients, I required working capital over total assets (WC/TA), retained earnings over 
total assets (RE/TA), earnings before interest and taxes over total assets (EBIT/TA), market 
value of equity over total liabilities (VE/TA) and sales over total assets (S/TA). A company that 
has a Z-Score above 2.675 is not likely to go bankrupt, while a company with a Z-Score below 
2.675 has a higher probability of bankruptcy. Altman’s (1968) original Z-Score is the following 
equation: 
𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 0.12  𝑊𝐶𝑇𝐴 + 0.014  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴 + 0.033  𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴 + 0.006  𝑉𝐸𝑇𝐴 + .999   𝑆𝑇𝐴 
Ohlson (1980) use multinomial choice techniques such as maximum-likelihood logit and 
probit. Hillegeist et al. (2002) argues that these methods are preferable to MDA. In my research I 
found why logit regression is preferred for two groups: it has fewer assumptions, similarity to 
regression, and has straightforward statistical tests. However, there must be a large sample for 
the increased accuracy of results. The O-Score uses nine variables and a constant to determine 
bankruptcy likelihood. For the O-Score, I needed ln(total assets) (SIZE), total liabilities over 
total assets (TL/TA), working capital over total assets (WC/TA), current liabilities over current 
assets (CL/CA), net income over total assets(NI/TA), funds from operations over total liabilities 
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(EBITDA/TL), an indicator for if net income had been negative for two consecutive years 
(NITWO), an indicator for if owners’ equity is negative (OENEG) and a change in net income 
from year to year (CHNI). If a company has a score greater than 0.5, it has a higher probability 
of default. The following is Ohlson’s (1980) original O-Score equation: 
𝑂 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =   −1.32− 0.407  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 6.030   𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴 − 1.430  𝑊𝐶𝑇𝐴 + 0.076   𝐶𝐿𝐶𝐴 − 2.370   𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐴
− 1.830  𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑇𝐿 + 0.285  𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑊𝑂 − 1.720  𝑂𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐺 − 0.521  𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐼   
A single period logit model was used as my regression technique for the estimation of both 
the Z-Score and the O-Score. In Hillegeist et al. (2002) they diverge from this technique to try 
solving some of the problems that may arise. Including sample selection bias that arises from 
using only one, non-randomly selected observation per firm and failure to model time-varying 
changes in the underlying or baseline risk of bankruptcy. They chose to use a discrete hazard 
model to be able to account for this underlying risk of going bankrupt in a given period to correct 
this sample selection bias. Although these are valid concerns, the discrete hazard model was 
outside the limits of my research project. I chose to use the logit model due to its simplicity and 
proven effectiveness.  
 
b. Market-based  
Based on BSM theory, one can understand equity to be valued the same as a call option on 
the market value of a given firm’s assets. The following formula is for a BSM European call 
option:  
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𝑉! = 𝑉!𝑁 𝑑1 − 𝑋𝑒!"𝑁(𝑑2) 
In this formula, 𝑉! is the value of equity; 𝑉! is the value of assets; 𝑋 is the face value of debt 
maturing in t periods; r is the risk-free rate; and N(d1) and N(d2) are the standard cumulative 
normal of d1 and d2:  
𝑑1 = ln 𝑉!𝑋 + 𝑟 + 𝜎!!2 𝑡𝜎! 𝑡  
             
𝑑2 = ln 𝑉!𝑋 + 𝑟 − 𝜎!!2 𝑡𝜎! 𝑡  
N(d2) is the risk-neutral probability that the European call option will expire in the money, 
and N(-d2) is the risk-neutral probability of bankruptcy. Thus, N(-d2) is the probability of 
bankruptcy or BSM-PB 
In Hillegeist et al. (2002), they attempt to adjust for the fact that risky assets will earn a risk 
premium. They proxy for 𝜇 by using an equation for adjusted return on the book value of assets:  
𝜇 = 𝑁𝐼!!! + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝!!! ∗ (1− 𝑇𝑅)𝑇𝐴!!!  
These lagged variables are net income, interest expense and total assets. I assumed TR (tax rate) 
of 35%. 
 They also assume a continuous payout rate of dividends, D for convenience, instead of a 
quarterly dividend. They define D in terms of total assets. 
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 These terms of 𝜇 and D are used to see if there is more explanatory power through using 
them in place of r and dividends=0. The four different scenario combinations are: (r, 0), (𝜇, 0), (r, 
D) and (𝜇, D). I used all four of these combinations to test for their effectiveness. The equation 
for predicting the probability of bankruptcy, while substituting in 𝜇 for r and D for 0, or BSM-PB 
(𝜇, D) is as follows: 
𝐵𝑆𝑀 − 𝑃𝐵 𝐷, 𝜇 = 𝑁 − ln 𝑉!𝑋 + 𝜇 − 𝐷 − 𝜎!!2 𝑡𝜎! 𝑡  
 
III. Data 
My main datasets include both CRSP and Compustat. CRSP most importantly provided me 
with the delisting indicators and Compustat supplied me with the fundamentals annual that I 
needed to create the ratios to determine the Z-Score, O-Score and some of the inputs for the 
BSM variable. I also reference the Federal Reserve Economic Data website for the yearly risk-
free rates from 1979-2014.  
My main objective with my data was to have the best sample possible within the limits of my 
project. Like Hillegeist et al. (2002), I started my sample in 1979 the year directly proceeding the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. I included all firm observations through December of 2014. 
Hillegeist et al. (2002) found their bankruptcy filings from Moody’s Default Risk Services’ 
Corporate Default database and SDC Platinum’s Corporate Restructurings database. Using these 
databases, they had a total of 516 bankruptcies. I use CRSP to provide me with the delisting 
indicators for the event of default. This provided me with 183 companies that were delisted due 
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to bankruptcy from 1979 through 2014. Although the number of bankruptcies I had to work with 
was substantially less than Hillegeist et al. (2002), I did have more than both Altman (1968) with 
33 bankruptcies and Ohlson (1980) with 105 bankruptcies. 
The BSM required: lagged net income  (𝑁𝐼!!!), lagged interest expense (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝!!!), lagged 
total assets (𝑇𝐴!!!), book value of total assets (𝑉!), book value of total liabilities (𝑋), and 
standard deviation of the book value of total assets (𝜎!). 
After pulling and merging both datasets and checking for missing data points, I was left with 
a total of 234,323 firm year observations and 183 firm bankruptcies.  
   
IV. Results 
Table 1 is a summary of all the variables used in the calculation of the Z-Scores and O-
Scores. It includes all of the sample statistics: number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
as well as minimum and maximum values. The results have been winsorized. The NITA negative 
mean seemed interesting to me.  
Table 2 includes bankruptcy rates for each year from 1979-2014. It shows the number of 
firms for each year used in the analysis, number of bankruptcies per year and the total percentage 
of firms that went bankrupt. There is an increase in bankruptcies in the early 1990’s and the early 
2000’s. These were possibly due to Black Monday and the Tech Bubble. 
Table 3 shows the breakdown of the Z-Score and O-Score regression estimators. There is a 
column for both Altman’s and Ohlson’s original findings along with my estimations for each. 
Each coefficients estimate is given along with their significance level. There was substantial 
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significance in the Z-Score model with all five of the variables all at the 1% level The O-Score 
was significant for many coefficients as well: the intercept, size, total assets over total liabilities, 
the indicator for if net income had been negative for two consecutive years, and the indicator for 
if owners’ equity is negative, all at the 1% level. The funds from operations over total liabilities 
was also significant at the 5% level. It seems that both models have powerful explanatory 
strength. 
Table 4 shows the sample statistics for each of the Z-Scores both original and new, the O-
Scores both original and new, and the BSM results. Those results that are statistically significant 
are labeled as such. It was interesting to me that both estimations of the Z-Score and O-Score 
were statistically significant at the 1% or lower. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The coefficient estimates I found for the Z-Score similar in their accuracy in predicting the 
probability of bankruptcy compared with those of Altman (1968). This was a great finding 
especially due to my use of a larger sample size and the logit technique versus the MDA model 
approach. 
I also found that my estimates of the O-Score were similar in their predictive power when 
compared with those of Ohlson (1980). Although our results differed, their predictive power on 
the dataset were both very effective. This was probably due to our using the same logit technique 
and a similar sample size of bankruptcies. 
Due to some of the complexities of the BSM, I was unable to accurately estimate some of the 
key inputs needed by the formula. I used the book value of assets to substitute for the market 
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value of assets. Upon further reading I found that Hillegeist et al. (2002) had to estimate the 
market value of assets (𝑉!) and standard deviation of the market value of assets (𝜎!) using an 
optional hedge formula. I believe that these simulations are the reasons why I was unable to get 
results for my BSM measures. These calculations were not within the limits of my research 
project. Given this process I believe the BSM results would have been accurate and display 
predictive power. 
To conclude, I found that using accounting based predictive models is very effective and 
statistically significant.  The theory that a BSM contains all information still holds. However, 
there are other more complex techniques that provide us with these results. The methods in 
Hillegeist et al. (2002) were outside the limits of this project. I see many additional ways to 
continue in extending my research: applying a discrete hazard model, continuing with Hillegeist 
et al. (2002) in calculating more accurate inputs to the BSM, or using real observable changes in 
option prices.  
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  Table 1 
 Sample Statistics for Z-Score and O-Score Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. 
 
Max. 
WCTA 170,359 0.25365 0.27199 -0.6144 0.87653 
RETA 208,181 0.44782 0.28292 -0.4806 0.96837 
EBITTA 199,566 0.00017 0.24274 -1.3213 0.35907 
TLTA 207,627 0.54599 0.28184 0.03117 1.47401 
CLCA 170,306 0.67852 0.69664 0.04303 5.05899 
NITA 207,606 -0.04568 0.27022 -1.6071 0.29539 
FFOTL 201,939 0.04903 1.01201 -5.9114 2.57833 
STA 207,067 0.96464 0.84148 0 4.23125 
VETL 202,914 5686.18 13843.1 0 99829.7 
CHNI 186,784 0.00518 0.54558 -1 1 
SIZE 208,210 5.29063 2.40646 0.32710 11.33 
NITWO 234,506 0.14115 0.34817 0 1 
OENEG 234,506 0.14160 0.34864 0 1 
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Table 2 
Bankruptcy Rate per Fiscal Year 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
 
 
 
Number 
of 
Firms 
 
Number of 
Bankruptcies 
 
Percentage 
of Failed 
Firms 
 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
 
 
 
Number 
of 
Firms 
 
 
Number of 
Bankruptcies 
 
Percentage 
of Failed 
Firms 
1979 4751 1 0.023%  1997 9995 3 0.035% 
1980 4906 3 0.069%  1998 9785 3 0.036% 
1981 5203 3 0.065%  1999 9436 4 0.049% 
1982 5572 5 0.103%  2000 8986 7 0.089% 
1983 6024 5 0.095%  2001 8404 8 0.110% 
1984 6206 6 0.109%  2002 8162 16 0.231% 
1985 6425 2 0.036%  2003 8011 5 0.075% 
1986 6829 6 0.101%  2004 7916 7 0.105% 
1987 7145 1 0.016%  2005 7922 4 0.060% 
1988 7213 8 0.126%  2006 7888 1 0.015% 
1989 7215 2 0.032%  2007 7830 1 0.015% 
1990 7437 7 0.112%  2008 7604 4 0.060% 
1991 7817 14 0.220%  2009 7338 8 0.124% 
1992 8377 21 0.311%  2010 7173 3 0.046% 
1993 9178 11 0.147%  2011 7073 3 0.046% 
1994 9550 0 0.000%  2012 6596 2 0.033% 
1995 9993 4 0.049%  2013 6209 2 0.035% 
1996 10206 1 0.012%  2014 5815 2 0.041% 
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Table 3 
Z-Score and O-Score estimations 
 
Altman’s 
(1968) 
Model 
Altman’s 
Original 
Estimates 
Revised 
Parameter 
Estimates 
 Ohlson’s 
(1980) 
Model 
Ohlson’s 
Original 
Estimates 
Revised 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Intercept  -2.7463*  Intercept -1.320 -11.1874* 
WC/TA -0.12 1.2786*  Size -0.407* 0.1566* 
RE/TA -0.14 -2.7656*  TL/TA 6.030* 3.4169* 
EBIT/TA -0.033 -2.4518*  WC/TA -1.430** 0.5754 
VE/TL -0.006 -0.0411*  CL/CA 0.076 0.00745 
S/TA -0.999 0.2935*  NI/TA 2.370** 0.1033 
    FFO/TL -1.830* -0.2713** 
    NITWO 0.285 1.1264* 
    OENEG -1.720* 1.0583* 
    CHIN -0.521* 0.0484 
       
       
-2 Log  2398.422  -2 Log  2,320.892 
Observations  163,707  Observations  151,962 
* significant at 1% or lower  
** significant at 5% or lower  
*** significant at 10% or lower  
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Table 4 
Sample Statistics and Predictive Power 
 
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
ZSCORE* 163,707 39.77892 84.8051 -0.03677 603.3342 
ZSCORENEW* 163,707 266.5619 582.385 -5.00611 4,108.66 
OSCORE* 152,108 -0.622625 3.29882 -11.0763 21.7583 
OSCORENEW* 152,108 -8.275825 1.18581 -11.7123 -2.42279 𝐵𝑆𝑀𝑃𝐵1! 207,031 0.003636 1.00108 -3.98516 4.62651 
* significant at 1% or lower  
** significant at 5% or lower  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. I am only reporting one BSM-PB. I ran 4 different BSM-PB as was discussed in “Research and Design” 
earlier in the paper, namely (rfrate, 0), (𝜇, 0), (rfrate, D), and (𝜇, D). They all returned the same result. I ran 
correlation tests on BSM-PB 1-4 and found them perfectly correlated. D was not significantly different than 
zero. Although 𝜇 and the risk free rate were significantly different, when applied to the probability of 
bankruptcy equation and passed through the normal distribution, they were perfectly correlated.  
